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Original article 
Digital Use and Mistrust in the Aftermath 
of the Arab Spring: Beyond Narratives of 
Liberation and Disillusionment  
Abstract  
Via the prism of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010-2011, new 
media has been presented as diametrically opposed to the top down and mistrusted. 
Asking the question: In what ways do trust, privacy and surveillance concerns intersect 
and inflect the individual and collective practices of young people in networks of 
participation, and their sense of civic connection through old and new media?, this paper 
presents a nuanced understanding of the relationship between digital media and mistrust. 
Through the study of original case studies in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE, we 
examine attitudes towards and usage of digital media in creating and maintaining 
political, civic, cultural and artistic networks amongst communities. We analyse our 
abundant qualitative interviews, observations and ethnographic data collected to reveal 
the continuity of media mistrust as people move into the digital arena. As new tools 
continue to be launched many young people in the region remain alert to the ways in 
which these tools can serve or hinder individual and group aims. Beyond narratives of 
liberation, disillusionment or democratisation, ‘new’ media poses both mundane and 
surprising challenges in encouraging and engaging networks of participation in the 
MENA region. 
Keywords  
Digital ghettos; participation; youth; media mistrust; MENA; Social Media 
The presence of social media and digital platforms, particularly during the 2010-2011 
uprisings known as the ‘Arab Spring’, have encouraged narratives about new media’s 
influence on democratisation. Our scepticism about overly enthusiastic narratives of new 
media’s role (which in turn diminished the agency and history of social actors and 
dissident movements), led us to delve into the ways in which young people use digital 
platforms in their existing networks, or use them to create and establish new networks of 
participation. First, our main concern has been the steep differences in penetration rates 
and internet use within the region and, in particular, in our four countries of study. While 
reports like to claim a steady increase in internet penetration in all countries in the 
region,1 the contrasts between Jordan (53.4 %), Morocco (57.1 %), Tunisia (48.5 %), and 
the UAE (91.2 %)2 remain stark. Second, television continues to be more popular than 
the internet across the region with 93% of the population being viewers (despite a 
reported fall from 98% since 2013).3 Amongst social media users, while Facebook’s 
popularity in the region has been unquestionable until now, its usage has declined in 
recent years, -20% since 2013. Recent reports claim that messaging apps like WhatsApp 
are at the top of the list of social media used (Radcliffe and Lam, 2018). Third, such 
statistics do not account for nuances in the use of platforms, and their role in bolstering or 
dismantling longstanding pre-digital networks.   
The recent history of media and ICTs in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region is marked by what has been categorised as the liberalisation of 
broadcasting, particularly in our four countries of research, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and 
the UAE.4 States like Morocco and Tunisia appear to have given up partial control in 
favour of private ownership of TV and radio channels; however, these are now owned by 
businessmen and families close to the regimes in question or even directly by regimes 
through private holdings (Gana, 2013: 166; Hidass, 2010).  So, this ownership 
diversification is mostly a cosmetic move. Further, rules and regulations controlling entry 
to the broadcasting field remain confusing, unclear, and tied to political interests. And, 
despite its impressive 420 million Arabic speaking population,5 the economic takings of 
the media sector remain undisclosed, although sources suggest that few satellite channels 
are financially sustainable (Kraidy, 2008: 98). All this contributes to many young 
people’s mistrust of information gleaned from radio, television and newspapers in the 
region.  
According to a report on media use in the region from the Northwestern 
University in Qatar (2017), concerns about privacy have also affected the way social 
media is used in the region; yet only one in five citizens say they are concerned about 
privacy.6 In this regard, according to the same study, it is interesting to note that only 
18% of UAE nationals are worried about state control of online use in comparison to 
48% of Tunisians or 30% of Jordanians.  
Our paper draws on sixteen original case studies consisting of interviews, 
observations and textual analysis carried out for a collaborative project Personalised 
Media and Participatory Culture in the MENA7 to provide an in-depth examination of 
how young people from Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE navigate issues of trust 
and surveillance in everyday media use. As we will argue based on our cases studies, our 
four countries evidence ever-decreasing trust in commercial and state provision. We 
examine the fact that despite the multiple optimistic accounts of digital media during and 
after the ‘Arab Spring’ which cast them as advocates of civic participation and liberation, 
many young people across the region use this ‘new’ mode of communication with similar 
caution and scepticism to that prompted by broadcast media. 
‘New’ media: narratives of liberation and disillusionment 
Changes in the MENA media landscape have often been read in an optimistic manner as 
initiating discourses of democratization and liberation (Hafez, 2008: 1). Technological 
development has been connected to narratives of democratisation, and linked with 
modernity, progress and what are seen as the social values of the ‘liberal’ West 
(Armbrust, 2012; Guaaybess, 2013). Early studies of radio and television in the global 
south already positioned ‘modernisation’ at their core. Walter Armbrust argues that, ‘for 
many, the relatively low rate of new media usage in the Arab world was taken as a sign 
of cultural backwardness’ (2012: 157). Indeed,  
[t]his faith in media is not reconsidered or questioned even by UNESCO, for 
instance, which continues its crusade for modernization via media and, today, via the 
Internet. UNESCO defends the idea that it is necessary to reduce “the digital divide 
between rich and developing countries”, even though the role of media in 
development has never been clearly established’ (Guaaybess, 2013: 2–3)  
The internet and social media serve as the bearers of a narrative that continues to be the 
measuring tool to draw a line between first and third worlds, as well as to champion 
feelings of Eurocentric superiority in an effort to present nations as ‘progressive’, 
‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ in line with their citizens’ embrace of new and emerging media. In 
the context of declining trust in old media, and increased attention to fake news, the 
question of civic trust towards new media tools and social media platforms is paramount. 
Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, have been cases which prompted idealised 
stories of ‘success’: in the imaginary of commentators, web 2.0 becomes the saviour and 
most trusted information source of those living under oppressive or authoritarian regimes, 
and young people are thought to have a unique affinity for new media tools. Well-known 
cyber-utopian voices regarding MENA media include Benmamoun et al. (2012), Howard 
and Hussain (2013; 2013), Khamis (2013), and Breuer (2015; 2014). This view can be 
summed up by the following statement in Lynch (2014, p. 95): ‘[t]he new generation of 
young people communicates differently, interacts differently, and has different 
expectations of the public sphere than previous generations did … a strong correlation 
and environmental case can be made that this new information environment has 
empowered political and social activism’ (emphasis added).  
Of course, scholars such as Gunter et al. (2016), Mehdi Mabrouk (2011), 
Mohamed Zayani (2015) and Nouri Gana (2013)  offer a more nuanced analysis of the 
role of digital media in the 2010-11 uprisings. Zayani’s (2015) work suggests that while 
the internet may have been useful for activists living far from the region – for instance, in 
the Tunisian diaspora in France – it was a limited and less accessible tool when 
considered alongside the strategies of well-established face-to-face social movements in 
the region. In an attempt to rebalance attention to aspects of Tunisia’s history, Mabrouk 
(2011) and Zayani (2015), in their respective studies, point to numerous events of social 
unrest in Tunisia prior to the 2010-2011 protests, including a significant trade union 
movement. While studies have shed light on the historical narrative that connects social 
movements with the ‘Arab Spring’ and hence offer more comprehensive narratives of the 
2010-2011 events, mistrust towards both traditional broadcast and ‘new’ and emerging 
media is addressed only incidentally.  
 Alongside other factors, let us consider the issue of access with regard to the 
argument that increased social media use is responsible for increased knowledge about 
and public participation in anti-authoritarian protest. In the face of an almost uniformly 
digital optimist media narrative, George Joffé (2011) suggested that it had not been 
proved that either ‘mobile telephone technology nor the internet – whether as Twitter or 
Facebook– were essential to the success of the demonstrations in Tunisia or Egypt’ 
(2011: 525). Indeed, mobile networks and internet providers were shut by the authorities 
in both countries at some point during the protests, and the protests continued. Old 
technologies, Joffé went on to claim, ‘may have been more important, especially satellite 
television which is universally accessible and much more difficult to shut down, as 
regimes have discovered to their cost’ (2011, p. 525). Data from the Arab Media Outlook 
2011-2015 (2012) suggests that in 2010 Tunisia had almost one TV set per household. In 
2010, however, internet penetration was only 36.8%. If access to mediated information is 
a key component in civic consciousness, then it is difficult to dismiss the role of 
television, and in particular of Al-Jazeera’s critical coverage of unfolding events, as well 
as of ubiquitous graffiti and other media forms, in favour of digital media as a tool for 
creating a sense of common identity, circulating news, and airing grievances.  
In line with a more sceptical take on the attribution of social change to new 
media, Belghazi and Moudden (2016) in Morocco, and Gana (2013) in Tunisia, engage 
with the idea of a disenchantment experienced once the uprisings had cooled down. 
While Gana initially explores the important role that social media had in circulating news 
(2013: 6), he then emphasises the mistrust which developed in the aftermath: ‘many 
Tunisians eventually felt dismayed and disenchanted with Facebook and social media….’ 
(2013: 7). In contrast to the ‘presentist’ (Postill, 2012) writings on new media 
revolutions, Gana (2013: 18) and Zayani (2015: 62–68) emphasise Tunisia’s history of 
cultural dissent and of spontaneous workers’ movements in keeping alive a spirit of 
rebellion.  
Likewise, with regard to Morocco, Belghazi and Moudden frame the aftermath of 
the 2011 uprisings as a time of ihbat, Arabic for deception or disillusionment. Social 
media, they claim, actually only ‘served to amplify the movement and abetted the 
optimism of the demonstrators’ (2016: 39). Such narratives of initial optimism and 
eventual disillusionment contextualise the fact that when movements do not lead to 
significant political change, theories that make a causal argument about social media and 
liberation collapse and commentators lose interest in researching these cases further. 
Detailed, multi-perspectival and historicised accounts are needed to ensure that we do not 
oversimplify the role of old or new media in people’s everyday lives before, during and 
after uprisings and protest movements.  
Civic mistrust 
Several key scholars in communications and political science connect the notion of trust 
in institutions such as the media with the idea of strong, democratic civil society (Barber, 
2003; Dahlgren, 2009; Luhmann, 1979; Miszal, 1996). Hauser and Benoit-Barner 
approach trust as ‘a paramount problem when the conditions of civil society make us 
mutually dependent on partners whose diversity so increases in scope and complexity as 
to exceed our capacity to understand the basis for their actions or their level of 
commitment to common goals’ (2002: 270–271). Summarising the literature on trust (and 
mistrust), Hauser and Benoit-Barner discuss several propositions, including the 
following: 1. Trust surfaces in conditions of uncertainty. If one knows for sure, one does 
not need to trust; 2. Trust emerges in situations in which a choice between alternatives is 
required; 3. To trust, one must rely on beliefs about others to form expectations about 
their behavior and use these expectations to make choices; 4. To trust one must rely on 
the familiar to anticipate the unfamiliar in the sense that one uses the available repertoire 
of experiences to form expectations and 5. Relationships of trust are self-stabilized by 
establishing an obligation to honor trust. As outlined in the introduction, all of these 
relationships of trust and conditions for trust between citizens and print or broadcast 
media, can be seen as repeatedly threatened in the MENA region by authoritarian media 
ownership, non-transparent regulation, curtailed liberalization, surveillance, censorship, 
and the reality of inaccurate, fake or delayed reportage. Rhetorical attempts to bolster the 
image of the mainstream broadcast media as trustworthy appear to work primarily with 
citizens who are in ideological alignment with the media outlets’ views. Likewise, 
mistrust of fellow citizens and of the state has deep roots in everyday experience. Beliefs 
in the mutual reliance of citizens, and of the fairness of governance, have been 
undermined by a plethora of mediated or directly deployed authoritarian practices that 
surveille, punish or constrain citizens.  
A culture of fear often protects the power of authoritarian regimes. This is well 
known to the populace across the MENA region – as well as in Latin American studies 
(Corradi et al., 1992; Rotker and Goldman, 2002) and in Western states (Giroux, 2003). 
In North Africa, the internalised ‘respectful’ fear towards power is articulated as ‘hiba’ or 
‘hibat addawla’ (meaning to look imposing, and to inspire fear and respect), which has 
historically characterised the relationship between the state and civil society (Leveau, 
1997: 96). Acknowledgement of this fear in the literature on new media is very recent 
(El-Issawi, 2016; Lynch et al., 2016; Zaid, 2016). Many in the region experience the 
feeling that in their everyday lives they are being listened to and observed by the deep 
state, which fuels a culture of mistrust among citizens (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2011: 128; 
Smith and Loudiy, 2005: 1099). This culture of mistrust is widespread and enacted 
through wariness in everyday situations, from sharing a taxi to talking in a public café. 
Examples of mistrust, fear and wariness are present throughout our data, and particularly 
in Tunisia, Morocco and UAE. Suggesting the dialectical nature of trust, mistrust and 
civic interaction, these topics were discussed with us, sometimes openly but also often in 
covert ways, where mistrust was extended to the nature of our own investigation on 
media practices and networks of participation, especially in the case of the UAE. 
Methods and research design 
We deliberately chose four contrasting countries with different colonial histories, distinct 
governance structures, socioeconomic patterns, levels of internet penetration and media 
cultures – Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and UAE – to exemplify the need to discuss youth 
participation, new media and the MENA region in a differentiated manner.  
Our research was initially textual and encompassed the collection and analysis of 
cultural, social and political materials produced by groups on and off-line in the MENA 
region and the textual ‘mapping’ of hundreds of overlapping civic and political networks 
frequented by young people between the ages of 17 and 30 in the four countries. We 
undertook this mapping in order to provide a context for the choice of our future case 
studies: namely, to examine the most frequent sorts of civic networks – were they 
students? Workers? Urban or rural or both? Overtly political or deliberately apolitical? 
We also examined the extent to which forms of art and creativity such as film, music and 
art featured in these groups’ as a central issue or a tool of communication; and we 
examined whether there were connections between networks fighting for social justice 
and those fulfilling cultural functions for particular communities. In fact, we discovered 
that there were intergenerational and cross-media connections between many of the 
existing civic networks within each country, but that some were quite isolated, and 
sometimes deliberately so. We also found a large number of local and regional civic 
networks that chose to keep a low profile, chose not to connect themselves to others with 
similar names or interests nationally or internationally, and that were based on face-to-
face or traditional media ties. In interviews we discovered that they shunned a wider 
membership quite deliberately in an effort to ensure trust.  
This qualitative ‘mapping’ phase was followed by ethically alert participant 
observation, in-depth qualitative interviews, and focus groups, to generate a series of 
contrasting case studies. In all countries participants either chose to have pseudonyms or 
to use their own names because this would benefit them and we respected these choices. 
Interviews and focus groups were recorded, translated and written up and analysed 
thematically in conjunction with observational field notes and photographs. These in-
depth case studies – several of which are the focus of this paper – were systematically 
chosen to illustrate examples of the different types of civic networks that exist in the 
region, including newer (ones that have sprung up in the wake of new media) and older 
ones (that might be adapting in various ways to the new media network culture), ones that 
had an overt focus on gender and protected characteristics and ones that were embedded 
in patriarchal cultures, ones that were self-reflexive about their political potential and 
ones that either ignored or deliberately shunned the arena of the political. 
We trained our four research assistants in the region– Asma Alabed in UAE, Rita 
Adel in Jordan, Chadi Chahdi in Morocco and Sara Attafi in Tunisia, and Monica 
Ibrahim in London– extensively in qualitative methods, and provided them with 
theoretical literature and fieldwork instruments such as interview schedules and fieldwork 
templates. In collaboration with them we chose to focus on networks of participation 
which illustrated the peculiarities of a set or group of young people between the age of 15 
and 35 involved in a broadly civic cause – artistic production, popular social movement 
or other social enterprise – that had used, or utilises new and emerging media for 
communication and connection. We were exceptionally sensitive to issues of social class, 
gender and exclusion, deliberately seeking out, and taking time to get to know and win 
the trust of, networks to which contained working class and lower middle class 
participants, since it was always much easier to contact networks of predominantly well 
to do and well connected citizens. Table 1 lists the variety of networks included in our 
research. 
Morocco Jordan Tunisia UAE London 
Football 
Ultras 
‘Books on the 
Road’ 
LGBTQ & 
Feminist 
Motorbikers Al-Arabiya 
Film-makers 
network 
Jadal – 
Cultural Cafe 
Gamers Musical/artistic 
venues 
 
Sufi 
musicians 
Heavy Metal  Manich_Msamah Counselling 
and self-
disclosure 
 
Trainee 
teachers union 
 Les Volontaires Digital 
podcasting 
 
Table 1. Groups and networks examined in the MENA and diaspora 
In focus groups or interviews, and during observations and in our analysis, we 
asked questions that would allow us to elaborate on the depth and types of individual and 
group participation in civil, religious, political, artistic and other networks offline, the 
connections between social class and creative production, the extent to which emerging 
digital platforms can be or already are being transformed into networked communities of 
participation, the connections between creativity and political transformation, and 
whether there is evidence that these networks are beginning to include otherwise 
disconnected communities in the MENA region in non-digital situations. We analysed the 
data from observations and interviews thematically, critically contrasting our findings to 
existing narratives about media and new media in the MENA region. Issues that jumped 
to the fore were digital mistrust, new media avoidance, civic-branding and online self-
promotion. Therefore, this paper asks the following question: In what ways do issue of 
trust, privacy and surveillance intersect in the MENA region and inflect the individual 
and collective practices of young people in participatory networks and their sense of civic 
connection through old and new media?  
Media mistrust and surveillance 
Distrust of traditional media was palpable even in the UAE where our interviews engaged 
much less explicitly with criticisms of the state. Harris, a member of a motorbike network 
in Dubai told us sarcastically ‘Well, look at the newspapers in the UAE, everybody is 
happy! – Adding – And look at the news here, everything is perfect!’ A conversation 
about road safety and traffic accidents thus prompted a comment on the lack of freedom 
of information across UAE media. The same idea was reiterated by Sami, member of Les 
Volontaires, a Tunisian association interested in empowering young people through an 
engagement with everyday environmental and cultural issues: ‘… most of the time you 
can’t find real and important information on the TV news.’  
In spite of the discussions above which might suggest that distrust of TV and 
newspapers is to be expected, while new media is now seen as the go-place for youth 
who want ‘trustworthy’ news, we received similar responses of mistrust when asking 
about online news sites. Maha, a young Moroccan screenwriter and director, explained: ‘I 
don’t trust news websites, except if it’s the same news everywhere. Now e-newspapers 
only care about having as many views as they can. If they think disseminating fake news 
would help them reach that, they will do it, just as … tabloids [exist offline], [that genre 
of news source] also exists on the internet.’ Likewise, Mohamed, a Moroccan sound 
engineer and member of a young people’s cinema network, expressed scepticism about 
online media. While some reports argue that more youth in the MENA region are 
accessing news through social media (Inside the hearts and minds of Arab youth, 2016) it 
is clear that the feeling towards online news retains the healthy scepticism that is applied 
to news from television, radio and the press. 
Football ultras outspokenly denounced the state’s online surveillance. Souhail and 
Zakariya suggested that the group are equally mistrustful of the police and of traditional 
media. Ahmed, another interviewee, explained ‘the virtual world is no longer an open 
space to express yourself fully. If you want to start an initiative, [the state] can get people 
to destroy it and … [t]he surveillance of cell phones and computers from the satellites 
comes first and then comes the work of the police district chief’. A key point to note here, 
however, is that they are undeterred from their civic mission by surveillance and media 
bias. Ultras we interviewed came across as alert, mistrustful and active on social media, 
using it to their advantage. In order to protect themselves from state surveillance they 
avoid showing recognisable faces or names, as Souhail explained. On their YouTube 
channel proxidotcom, music is posted without authors being named. Singers are 
disguised. Other information that may lead to arrests is redacted. In this sense, while 
mistrust of state tactics that begins around traditional media extends to social media, even 
given the more limited access people have, social media does allow for users to resist 
mainstream narratives. This happens not just at the level of belief and consciousness, but 
also at the level of action and discursive production. 
For members of other networks, online anonymity is far harder to maintain. For 
this reason, we were told, social media is not a preferred option in organising protests. It 
is used, however, to advance a group’s political agenda by ‘playing’ with net 
surveillance, and planning misinformation about group activities to mislead the 
authorities. Bouazza, a member of the teacher trainees’ union in Morocco, said in this 
regard, that the organisation of protests happens  
mostly through phone calls, and organisational matters mostly go through the phone, we 
use the internet rarely. Sometimes we say [online that] we’re going to meet here, but we 
don’t meet there, but we let the media know that we’re meeting there… to deceive… It’s 
not trickery, but we give the wrong spot to the Ministry of the Interior.  
 
This group of activist trainee teachers uses apps selectively depending on their aim and 
need for privacy. Private WhatsApp groups are used by coordinators, as these can adapt 
to changes in the coordination of groups, such as altered telephone numbers and the 
ability to create new groups instantly. Public Facebook pages, YouTube channels and 
hashtags are part of their efforts to disseminate their struggle; but these reveal minimal 
private information as we discovered at the mapping stage, except through metadata, 
which are not so easily accessed. As Houda another trainee teacher union member 
admits, the use of the hashtag was picked up by Al Jazeera Arabic programme ‘Hashtag’, 
helping them to get the message about trainee teachers’ pay and conditions out more 
widely. Despite Houda’s praise of their social media presence and activity, she also 
insisted that committee decisions are only made during face-to-face offline meetings: ‘we 
mostly rely on direct contact with the teacher trainees in the training centres; however, 
Facebook played a role in communicating our final decision of the meeting to the public’. 
Mouhsin, another member of the union, agreed with Houda in contesting the notion of 
social media as irreplaceable platforms for democratic discussion outside the West.  
Trust building strategies 
Sali, one of the founders of The Green Room, a platform for young musicians in the 
UAE, suggested a different way of looking at the use of online and offline spaces to 
create networks of participation. Discussing people who approach her about becoming 
part of The Green Room’s activities, she explained that she prefers to meet people online 
first rather than face-to-face as this allows her to find out more about the person ‘because 
it enables ... more chances for me to find out who you are before [I meet you and] I’m 
able to kind of form a response’. The fact that using the internet and social media profiles 
to ‘police’ or check out the activities and legitimacy of fellow-citizens who wish to 
participate in civic initiatives was only mentioned explicitly in our UAE case study, 
suggesting a social and political context of anxiety over state control and surveillance 
which had an effect on our research in the UAE. However, all the networks we examined 
have ways of policing the boundaries for members and non-members, and several, such 
as CHOUF in Tunisia rely on either Skype interviews or face-to-face encounters before 
agreeing to membership, if membership is actually a desirable criterion. 
Thus, mistrust of media and of other citizens can be seen as a building block for 
and an impediment to civic and political action and empowerment. In our case studies it 
takes a plethora of forms including refusal to watch or listen to media/political output, a 
tendency towards complaint and generic conspiracy theories, subversive and dissident 
engagement with mainstream media narratives, or a search for multiple alternative 
sources to corroborate news.  
Artivism, entrepreneurial networks and branding 
Online presence came across as an important means of building an artistic or activist 
brand. CHOUF describes itself on its website (in English followed by French and Arabic) 
as a ‘feminist, separatist organization interested mainly in women’s bodily and sexual 
rights in Tunisia.’8 Chouf only accepts members who identify as female; issues of trust 
are paramount in their procedures for admission. New members are required to have two 
sponsors within the organisation, and need to go through a six-month test period. While 
Skype is sometimes the first point of contact, face-to-face soon follows. The purpose, as 
Dorah one of its founders told us, is to filter out members who identify themselves as 
men ‘because simply our priority in CHOUF is to provide a “safe space” for women’. 
Despite the safety-related hurdles to becoming part of this organisation, CHOUF is 
adamant in its use of audio-visual material uploaded online to disseminate its message 
and pursue its political agenda. CHOUF has active Facebook and Twitter accounts. Thus, 
online presence is valuable not only in promoting their activities and creating awareness 
of gender issues within and beyond Tunisia, but also in inviting non-members to 
participate, and in vetting potential members or reacting to individual crises where 
geographical co-location is not possible.  
In spite of the general lack of trust in media, new marketing and branding 
opportunities among young people have developed within social networking sites 
(Bennett and Robards, 2014). While most of the initiatives we researched had a civic 
participatory ethos, both traditional and new media emerged as key elements in most 
groups’ aim to grow the sphere of influence of their organisation or network. The 
connection between civic participation, media and brand image featured especially in the 
case of the cultural and music scene in Dubai. Tala, a 24-year-old independent musician, 
mentioned the changes in the music scene, how it was male-dominated and 
instrumentalised indigenous culture. Ultimately, however, self-promotional hype via 
social media, and the elitism of the scene, proved to be generators of mistrust amongst 
more critical young people.  
Field observations led our research assistant in the UAE to agree with Tala’s 
critical comments on the way in which some cultural stakeholders in Dubai portray 
events as ‘independent’ and ‘grass-roots’ while organising them in five-star hotels, 
catering exclusively to the upper classes and with little interest in promoting local culture 
or cultural activities other than for profit. As Tala claimed, some of these initiatives 
‘make it sound like they really did something from nothing and … I don’t know how to 
say this politely, they’ve been like media whores, throwing themselves at every 
possibility, every magazine feature, every Dubai tourism sponsored documentary they 
can be in’. Hend, the creator of Tea with Culture, a podcast that talks about culture in the 
UAE, agrees with Tala; describing the most popular art gallery Al Serkal having a 
‘shopping mall mentality… it’s totally the mentality of a commercial space…’ and 
adding that these artistic spaces search for bloggers, influencers and hype on social media 
to promote their commercial agenda with no significant contribution to the local art 
scene. 90% of the artists they exhibit, she told us, are foreigners – usually white Expats – 
and not migrant workers from Africa or South Asia.  
Another of our cases exposed further this tension between civic participation and 
commercial profit in networks that bill themselves as social enterprises. Books on the 
Road, founded by Ghaith Dahboushe, aims at promoting reading among Jordanians. 
Ghaith uses the quaintly named ‘Nancy’, his aged Mercedes, as an ‘alternative space’ 
from which to exhibit and sell donated books at affordable prices in order to fund a 
library elsewhere. While Ghaith believes that his presence in the streets of Amman, and 
now in a store and cultural centre in Madaba, are key to getting Jordanian youth 
interested in reading, one of his colleagues, Ahmad, is adamant about the role media 
exposure plays in the success of the project: ‘Everyone has a smart phone, everyone has 
his mobile with them all the time, people open all their applications on the phone, 
Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Linked In, all the websites are always open’. 
Despite a lower than 50% internet penetration rate in Jordan, for Ahmad, mobile phones 
are synonymous with permanent internet access. To him the internet serves not only as a 
communication medium, but can also be a mechanism to sell books online and gain 
online payment. Requests for books are channelled through WhatsApp or their Facebook 
page. As Ahmed said, the website contributes to creating a brand for Kawn, which is the 
name of the group under which Books on the Road works. Ahmad’s use of social media 
is therefore at least partly directed to gain visibility for commercial profit. The absence of 
any awareness around access and social class when he discussed online media and online 
payment was discernible.  
What the scholarly emphasis on MENA political communication and new media 
that we drew attention to at the outset conceals, however, is the fact that groups of mainly 
middle class young people are capitalising on social media in entrepreneurial ways that 
have much to do with gentrification, and little to do with a desire for political liberation 
or social critique. Yet, culturalist narratives continue to emphasise social media use by 
young MENA citizens quite exclusively as a way to access news and participate in revolt 
(See the case of the Arab Youth Survey, 2016, The Middle East: A Region Divided, 
2017). 
New media refrainers, apolitical lurking and digital ghettos 
The networks of young people that we studied, which we present because they share 
typical features with multiple other civic networks across the four countries, capitalise on 
the differences between certain apps that allow for privacy (i.e. WhatsApp groups) and 
others that are more exposed (i.e. Facebook and YouTube). The tension for them is 
between a mass dissemination of activities and news, and the susceptibility to 
surveillance. Contrary to much of the literature about the internet in the aftermath of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, our study found that many young interviewees perceive 
all social media as a space with a limited capacity to create social and political 
engagement. While most had Facebook profiles and therefore in principle at least agreed 
with reports claiming Facebook as the king in the region (87% of social media users 
according to the Arab Social Media Report, 2015) in spite of its fall since 2013 (Radcliffe 
and Lam, 2018), many admitted that they were ‘not really active’ in this social network. 
Tamer, a freelance journalist who has worked in Jadal social and cultural centre in 
Amman, voiced what many of our interviewees across the four countries told us, that 
while he does have a Facebook page, his online presence is limited, with virtually no 
civic or political engagement: ‘I have Facebook, but I am not very active on it despite 
being a journalist’. Two other Jadal members, Yamen, a Syrian refugee of Palestinian 
decent, and Abdullah, a teacher at Jadal, had similar responses indicating deliberate 
social media disengagement.  
We received similar responses in Morocco. Mohamed from the cinema network 
told us: 
Honestly, I’m not very active on Facebook. I mean, I follow activities, but don’t 
leave comments or share content on my Facebook account. I’m a member of many 
groups on Facebook, but only related to cinema. I’m not involved or active on 
Facebook, I just follow posts shared by others. In my opinion, Facebook is not ideal 
or professional like YouTube is… I use YouTube a lot and email and I use LinkedIn 
to communicate with many people. 
The references to YouTube in our Moroccan case studies support figures that place 
Morocco as the second in the MENA region in numbers of YouTube subscribers.9  
The ghettoisation of the like-minded, facilitated by the ability of social media to 
create interest-based clusters or ‘bubbles’, came up in several of our case studies. 
Abdullah from Jadal was bothered by the desire for likes and shares, problems with 
privacy, and especially by the lack of acceptance of criticisms in comments that are 
deleted by page owners. He explained that he was concerned with the commercialisation 
and ghettoisation of culture, which he admitted were not exclusive to online practices in 
the Jordanian cultural field. The problem of ‘digital ghettos’ was mentioned during our 
interview with Khalil, a Tunisian graffiti artist and activist member of the 
Manich_Msamah (I will not forgive) initiative. This initiative started to campaign against 
the economic Reconciliation Act, which aims to protect politicians from Ben Ali’s 
regime, who are suspected of misusing public funds, from being prosecuted. One of 
Khalil’s roles within this network has been to tag physical walls and create public 
artwork for the group rather than to create a social media presence. According to him 
The common people who work by night for example, or who spend all day at work 
and could only go back home late… you cannot really make these people hear about 
you and your message through any other way…. The street walls are the best way to 
make them see and read the messages you want to them to see.  
In contrast to tags on walls – which bring the public of all political and class hues up 
against their messages - social media does not reach the very poor, and allows for people 
with contending ideologies to disengage, as discussed by Khalil 
Usually we do Facebook and social media to express our thoughts, right? However, 
if someone is following me and sees something that is not really pleasing for them… 
they would automatically block me… I personally leave Facebook to share cultural 
events I’m involved in… Facebook and social media are useful in these things but 
not to express myself.  
While messages on physical walls can be and are erased, Khalil believes this is a sign that 
the message has reached someone and annoyed them enough to make the effort of erasing 
it worthwhile.  
In spite of the idea that social media provides a free space that could be seen to 
compensate for the absence of collective public space in the MENA region, as argued by 
Howard and Hussain (2013: 5), our analysis of focus group data supports the argument 
that online platforms encourage ‘the clustering of like-minded people into polarized 
communities’ (Lynch et al., 2016: 7). With such clustering an integral part of the digital 
landscape, as Hindman (2009: 13) argues, being able to speak and being heard are 
distinct processes, especially when it comes to political messages.  
In this respect, Samah, another member of Manich_Msamah, told us that being 
active on Facebook and Twitter was useful because they already knew that ‘many people 
in [the] network were active on Facebook and it was easier to share information there’. 
This is the case with the Ultras in Morocco, who use Facebook to communicate with their 
followers because most members of their network are already there. However, in order to 
pass their messages to a broader audience they create tifos, visual banners displayed 
through a mixture of digital and physical choreography by fans in the stands of an arena 
or stadium, which are then broadcast by television networks and seen by a variety of 
publics. While Khalil and many of our interviewees across the four countries have online 
profiles, these play a limited role in encouraging civic and political initiatives beyond 
members who are already engaged with similar political interests. Paradoxically, perhaps, 
although there is a lower chance of dialogic response and greater possibility of erasure, 
walls and other physical spaces like football stadia reach wider audiences in an 
uncensored but collective way through graffiti, and thus become trusted if ephemeral 
means of political and civic dissemination: you know where you are with a physical wall.  
Conclusion 
Narratives of liberation and disillusionment around digital media and socio-political 
change are present in the MENA region, and evidenced in our research. They are, 
however, far more awkwardly intertwined – with each other and with less altruistic 
motives and feelings – than the literature suggests. Media branding for economic gain is 
common amongst those who promote their initiatives as educational or cultural (Sufi 
musicians who wish to be hired, cultural centres seeking members, cultural bookshops 
and the like). The literature on social media and the 2010-2011 MENA uprisings repeats 
an ahistorical narrative attached to the ‘Arab Spring’ where pre-protest youth are 
uncritically positive about the power of social media to bring political change while post-
revolutionary attitudes are tainted by disappointment. Although some of our interviewees 
declared that they were active during the ‘Arab Spring’, despite both direct and indirect 
questions, those events were rarely mentioned as a key moment that had an unparalleled 
effect on attitudes towards old media or new media (moving them from trust to mistrust 
or otherwise). While mainstream print and broadcast media are still regarded with 
mistrust – often rightfully – our reading of more critical literature and our analysis of 
cases from Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and UAE enables us to argue that caution and 
mistrust lead to more selective and critical uses – and avoidance – of new media tools, 
rather than to conspiratorial disengagement. Our systematic, contextually-specific 
analysis of attitudes of media trust and mistrust, and feelings about surveillance and 
‘over-exposure’ on social media across our typical cases of youth civic networks, urges a 
more complicated view of the relationship between civic mistrust and democracy.  If 
unquestioning trust in networked contacts met online or in news disseminated online 
might lead to young citizens unknowingly befriending a government agent, or to a belief 
in propaganda, then some mistrust is healthy, and justified.   
However, digital surveillance and cross-platform data-gathering are not the 
exclusive preserve of the state; these are used by vulnerable networks or individuals to 
check up on erstwhile new members, and to vet sources of information. Youth in the 
region have grown up within social, cultural and political circumstances whereby distrust 
of state-controlled media, of political parties, of trade unions and associations as well as 
of sharing political views in public spaces is the logical outcome of their own or their 
parents’ experiences. Although there may have been a flurry of joining and searching and 
liking and online experimentation, this lack of trust – and hence the premium on trusted 
networks – has not disappeared because of the existence of ‘new’ media platforms and 
tools; it has, rather, been tempered and transferred.  
We are all too aware of the limitations of our study. Having identified dozens of 
MENA civic networks started by or involving young people, from the most traditionally 
politicised ones to the artistic and entrepreneurial ones, we were only able to concentrate 
in depth on four of these in each country. In order to maintain some breadth amongst 
these cases, we could not pay special attention only to alternative media producers or 
follow our networks during politically heightened moments falling outside the months of 
the ethnographic data collection. Moreover, the fact that most of the cases that agreed to 
work with us were urban or peri-urban left most rural youth networks underexplored. 
With these limitations in mind, in the case of young civic producers/networks, it was only 
on rare occasions that distrust of mainstream media narratives seemed to galvanise the 
creation of sustained alternative social media content. The ones who did engage online 
most regularly were interested less in producing alternative journalism than in addressing 
everyday concerns (fighting against unjust laws, the stigma of mental illness, the social 
exclusion of LGBTQ communities, and fighting for access to or maintenance of public 
spaces, music traditions and freedom of speech) which were of great importance and 
urgency within their communities and their everyday lives and through which their 
experience of democracy was embodied. With the use of Facebook decreasing and with 
the development of new popular platforms such as Snapchat which include facial 
identification, further comparative studies of situated civic and leisure practices with 
digital and entirely non-digital networks, at times of stasis and times of upheaval will 
provide us with invaluable information on whether mistrust, privacy and surveillance 
continue to be issues inflecting these young citizens’ media practices. It will also be 
interesting to note whether mistrustful and cautious young MENA citizens’ continued 
democratic engagement leads those who currently fetishize civic trust (as one of the 
highest democratic values) or who fetishize new media (as inherently bottom-up), to 
change their perspectives.   
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